Around five years ago, the Max Plank
Institute in Freiburg asked me to write a chapter for a book exploring whether
there is an Islamic doctrine of pacifism that is comparable to the Christian
one. I don't know whether the book will actually be published, but in any
case I thought that given the symbiosis between Christian and Muslim
fundamentalists, whose systematic provocations of and violent reactions to each
other are increasingly having a negative effect on international politics, it
is a good time to increase public awareness of the alternative Islamic
discourses of freedom which are based on tolerance and liberty. It is time to
develop understandings of Islam which strive to reduce and eventually abolish
all forms of power and violence through processes of de-violentisation
throughout society, and hence to open more spaces for freedom and peace, which
are the preconditions of human development.
The doctrine of
de-violentization in Islam:
An alternative
to Christian pacifism?
Dr Mahmood
Delkhasteh
February 2007
Pacifism, particularly in the sense of its Christian
doctrine, is often thought to be incompatible with Islamic approaches to
resistance to power. Islam, on the other hand, is assumed to legitimate violent
resistance to power or even to promote aggressive violence. This paper
challenges both assumptions by arguing that Islam presents a method of
‘de-violentization’ that values peace and pacifist resistance but does not assume
that pacifism is appropriate or effective in all circumstances. This paper
introduces the doctrine of de-violentization in Islam by comparing it with the Christian
doctrine of pacifism. It takes a
critical approach, demonstrating the common denominator between the two
doctrines as well as their differences, and seeks to explain their theological
bases as well as their domains of action.
The theological roots of
pacifism in Christianity
The doctrine of pacifism in its most radical form,
which was developed by Anabaptists in the sixteenth century,
is understood as the refusal to use violence irrespective of
circumstances. The doctrine is based on
a marginalised Christian tradition that dates well before Anabaptism, and is
often justified through the pacifist practices of the historical
Jesus, who is assumed to
have been absolutely non-violent. Anabaptists particularly focus their
doctrine on Jesus’ prayers for the peacemakers:
Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of
God….Do not resist the evil man but whoever slaps you on the right cheek turn
to him the other also. And if anyone wants to sue you for your shirt, let him
have your coat as well. Love your enemies. Give to everyone who asks you; when
a man takes what is yours, do not demand it back (Luke 6:30 and Matthew
5:9-44).
However, while we know very little about
Jesus, the gospel of John narrates one well-known occasion on which he applied
violence in order to achieve a goal:
The Passover of the Jews was near, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem. In
the temple he found those who were selling cattle, sheep, and doves, and the
money changers seated at their tables. Making a whip of cords, he drove all of
them out of the temple, both the sheep and the cattle. He also poured out the
coins of the money changers and overturned their tables. He told those who were
selling the doves, “Take these things out of here! Stop making my Father's
house a marketplace!” (John 2:13)
There are many interpretations of this
event: a statement against capitalism, a condemnation of the Jewish priestly
hierarchy, or even a judgment on animal sacrifice. However, there is little serious debate about
the nature of the act itself, which, without stretching the imagination, can be
defined as seriously violent. It is not,
however, typically seen as such, and in the context of the violent society in
which Jesus lived is often understood as a non-violent act rather than an act
of lesser violence. Taking into account the various narratives of this event,
however, we can be sure of two facts regarding the act. First, Jesus was
outraged that the temple had been transferred into a marketplace and he
demonstrated his anger physically. Second, his physical expression of violence
was sufficiently strong to lead to the closure of the entire market.
Here we can ask a Sartrean-like question:
if Jesus allowed himself to use violence to evict money lenders from the
temple, what would he have done if he saw in front of him a man about to kill a
child with a sword? Based on his reaction in the temple, we might with a
high degree of certainty assume that he would intervene, even if this meant
resorting to violence in order to neutralise the violence of the man. In other words, Jesus could not have been an
advocate of absolute pacifism as the doctrine would have come into conflict
with his actual practice. Furthermore, the absolute rejection of violence would
have contributed to the spread of violence rather than to the creation of peace
and harmony, and to the domination of those who advocated pacifism itself. This
pattern is visible across societies: if one does not use ‘defensive violence’
to neutralize ‘aggressive violence’, then one submits to the latter, naked form
of power, which will exert itself until it reaches its goal of total domination
and control. Societies that are less
resistant to domination have historically been exploited more brutally than
those that resisted. An example was the German invasion of neighbouring
countries during World War II. What
would have happened if Hitler’s war of aggression were not resisted? It is hard
to imagine that this would have provided him with further opportunities to
pursue his aggressive policy. The failed
appeasement policy implemented by Britain provides a reasonable basis for this
assumption.
The theological roots of
de-violentization in Islam
The question is, does a
similar tradition of pacifism exist in Islam?
If not, is there an Islamic alternative to the Christian doctrine of
pacifism? In order to answer this, we
first have to understand and define violence.
One type of definition confines violence solely to acts of physical
violence; in its most brutal expression, as war. Another understands violence
as any action, behaviour or belief that violates human dignity and rights. If we adopt the latter meaning, we can argue
that Islam advocates a doctrine of de-violentization
in order to decrease and eliminate violence in all forms and
manifestations. ‘De-violentization’
refers to the implementation of policies, which can lead to decreasing and
eventually eliminating violence: of individuals towards themselves, towards
each other, and towards the environment.
Although this doctrine prioritizes pacifism, it also recognizes the
possibility that controlled and limited use of ‘defensive violence’ may be
necessary in order to neutralise ‘aggressive violence’ if the conditions for
its total elimination are not in place.
The theological roots of this doctrine are
based on a Koranic understanding of human nature, which is that individuals are
born with a Godly nature or fetrah. ‘(establish) God’s handiwork
according to the pattern on which he has made humans’, it states (Koran,
30/30). This nature or fetrah is Tawhid, meaning most simply
‘Oneness of God’. The concept, however, has far-reaching consequences –
something recognized by Islamic Sufis but unfortunately lost in traditional
Islamic theology, which has limited the meaning of Tawhid to mere
monotheism. More broadly, Tawhid
can be understood as the unification of humans with God, with other humans and
with nature. It is a reflection of human freedom and the absence of all
types of power relations. Tawhid
refers to a lack of separation between everything existing, a unity of self and
other, individual and society, God and human, human and nature; it disrupts
these dichotomies and makes them untrue. Tawhid is the “motion
toward a great and multi-faceted revolution, which leads to the establishment
of new social relations and new relations with nature and the individual
self. In such relations, nature,
society, and the thinking mind are not factors that limit human freedom, but
that expand them”.
From this perspective, human nature is
free from force and violence, and the concept of de-violentization is thus located
in a worldview based on Tawhid. It is rather through entering a world
filled with conflict and antagonism that people become alienated from their
nature and even become accustomed or addicted to the use of violence. The
acceptance of power and violence in human society as being normal and
inevitable, however, has been institutionalized in much Greek philosophy, which
is without exception based on a principle of dichotomy. As Water Benjamin, the
German philosopher argued, “it is often said that western philosophy consists
of footnotes to Plato”. It is thus not surprising
that philosophers like Hobbes could view humans as naturally brutal and
solitary, or that Machiavelli’s approach to politics was based on achieving and
maintaining power through any means. Their ideas
had social consequences: the fear of total destruction by the very nature of
human beings compelled them to want to control and regulate social relations,
and from this emerged the vision of a powerful and regulatory state. Also, until recently,
nature was seen as a threat to humans’ “natural” expansionist tendencies and
treated as an enemy that had to be dominated, conquered and exploited.
The core of this belief is still alive; in contemporary calls to halt
environmental destruction, we can trace a Hobbesian logic that we must preserve
nature simply to forestall our own destruction.
Within this context of the ubiquity of
dichotomous understandings of power and the widespread acceptance of violence
as a natural phenomenon, we can see the important role of both Tawhid and
de-violentization. The latter aims to return humans to their original
nature, which is free from force and based on freedom, and to reverse the
alienation of the human psyche. ‘De-violentization’ advocates systematic
approaches to removing the causes, changing the relationships and alleviating
the effects of the production and consumption of violence at socio-economic,
cultural and political levels, which may or may not be pacifist in form. The
following section explains how this can be done through de-violentizing
knowledge and belief.
De-violentizing knowledge
and belief
For instance, in the political domain,
de-violentization confronts dictatorial regimes with democratic practices. Participant democracy is the ideal model of
‘de-violentized’ political process, as it directly activates the talent of
leadership, which is one of many human talents. However,
representative democracy may be acceptable if and when the system works towards
establishing conditions for the development of participant democracy. This striving towards democratic inclusion
also has implications for freedom of expression. Since participation in social
leadership is not possible without the free flow of information and knowledge,
media in a ‘de-violentizing’ society must be free from governmental and other
forms of external interference, including commercial monopolization. Similarly, in the economic domain, there
should be no censorship on any information and knowledge that contributes to economic
progress, job creation and job satisfaction.
The economic system should aim to further and serve human development,
and economic progress should be achieved through human development. In other words, economic development becomes
a dependent variable rather than a condition of human development.
The importance of freedom is extended to even the most
intimate spheres of life. Sexuality should neither function as a tool of power
nor fulfill the needs of power, and should not be exploited for purposes of
consumption. Otherwise it may become another cause for the production and
consumption of violence. In order to
prevent this it is therefore necessary to remove all forms of sexual taboo that
prevent sexual satisfaction between consenting partners, as well as lifting
restrictions which lead to sexual tension and frustration that may have violent
implications in both private and public relations. It also becomes necessary to prevent natural
sexual needs and desires from being exploited by economic and political powers
that aim to increase consumption or social control.
Force should also be absent from all
belief systems. The Koranic verse “There
is no compulsion in religion” does not
simply mean that no one should be forced to hold a certain belief, but
indicates that there is no compulsion within the religion itself. In other words, no person or group can force
another to do something under the pretext of religion; religion is for people
and not vice-versa. In this
understanding, no war could ever be waged or legitimized for religious
purposes.
In intellectual life, the practice of
de-violentization systematically encourages people to reflect and be curious in
ways that facilitate the development of cultures of dialogue and debate. In the
Koran, there is a verse that announces ‘good news’: that “those who listen to
the word, then chose the best of it” are God’s favoured people. Fulfillment
of this verse requires internal freedom or open-mindedness as well as external
freedom, or the freedom of knowledge and information that allows an individual
to choose freely between different belief systems. Furthermore, since no authority can impose
this choice, no one can be stigmatized for having an “incorrect” belief. After all, since humans are born with a fetrah
that is Godly and free, as Imam Ali stated: “You are born free, so do not give
yourself to the humiliation of slavery”. This freedom
is also the basis for morality, as we must not only choose between good and
better, but also between good and bad. “Then He gave him”, reads the Koran,
“the talent of virtue and sin”.
From this perspective, society must be
based on the total freedom of expression and the freedom to choose one’s
beliefs. This is why Mohammad argued that the ways to God are as numerous
as people themselves, and why multiple interpretations of Islam and other
belief systems create a dynamic spiritual and intellectual society. This refers not only to believers of
different perspectives and faiths, but also to the right not to believe
in God. No one is obliged to think like
others, and Islamic doctrine aims at transforming the “masses” into a group of
thinking individuals who are not confined by society but enhanced by it. The
Koran explicitly delineates the foundations of a pluralistic
society on this basis:
Say: O
unbelievers!
I do not worship not that which ye worship,
Nor will ye worship that which I worship.
And I will not worship that which ye have been wont to worship.
Nor will ye worship that which I worship.
You shall have your religion and I shall have my religion.
It is important to note that the verse does not refer
to different interpretations of Islam but to the relationship between believers
and non-believers. Even within the context of Islam, this creates space for
multiple interpretations of the belief system. It
thus cannot be argued that since the Koran is considered to be the word of God
it cannot be interpreted. In fact, Ali
made a distinctly hermeneutical argument when he stated, “this Koran is the
written line and situated between two covers.
It does not talk for itself and inevitably has to be interpreted”.
A new basis for pluralism in Islamic
societies
The above argument provides part of a
religious rationale for social pluralism, but pluralistic society only becomes
dynamic and progressive when it develops reflexive people. Hence, there are
numerous verses in the Koran that encourage people to reflect and criticize
those who do not.
Thinking people have a duty to activate their human talent of leadership. One cannot accept the main pillars of Islam
(i.e., the oneness of God, Mohammad’s prophecy and resurrection) on the basis
of belief alone, as any belief that is devoid of reflection is inevitably
filled with fear or blind love, both of which defeat the purpose of being a
Moslem. Contrary to conceptualizations
of faith as obedience, reflexive faith depends on being able to observe and
criticize the behavior of one’s leaders. In fact, in Ali’s first public
speech made after he was elected as the fourth caliph of Islamic lands, he
stated that it was his right as leader to be criticized. During his
leadership, he consistently exercised this right.
The invitation to criticism and the
absence of compulsion in belief are fundamental to the development of free and
pluralistic societies. Within the Koran, there are in fact a number of examples
of how de-violentization might be pursued in regard to racial, gender and class
inequalities within society.
De-violentizing race
and racism
In the Koran, races and ethnic groups are viewed as
intrinsically equal, with none being superior or inferior to another and none
able to claim “chosen” status. It argues that differences between nations and
tribes exist for purposes of recognition and identity, not as sources of
division and inequality.
O you people! We created
you from a single (pair) of a male and female, and made you into nations and
tribes that ye may recognize each other.
Verily the most honored of you in the sight of God is who is the most righteous
of you.
The essentialisation and prioritization of race is in
fact defined as satanic:
(God) said: What hindered
you so from bowing down [to humans] when I commanded you?
He (Satan) said: I am
better than he: Thou hast created me of fire, while him Thou didst create of
dust.
In other words, Satan was the first being to enter
power relations by essentializing race, and for this he was banished.
Based on this principle of equality and recognition,
the Koran provides grounds for the eradication of racism, which is one of the
worst forms of social violence. The
doctrine of de-violentization aims to establish harmonious social relations by
removing this type of discrimination, which has historically plagued many societies
and undermined the creation of democratic communities.
De-violentizing gender and sexism in society
Gender relations can and must also be de-violentized,
as the success of this doctrine depends on the eradication of all forms of
discrimination. The Koran challenges the
historically dominant definition of women as being inferior to men. Unlike the
traditionalists’ belief, which is heavily affected by an Aristotelian view of
women,
the Koran views men and women as essentially equal:
O people! be careful of
(your duty to) your Lord, Who created you from a single being and created its
mate of the same (kind) and spread from these two, many men and women.
Furthermore, the relationship between men and women is
based not on power relations, which are necessarily conflictual, but rather on
love and compassion:
And one of His signs is
that He created mates for you from yourselves that you may find rest in them,
and He put between you love and compassion; most surely there are signs in this
for a people who reflect.
De-violentizing class and economic
inequality
In addition to eliminating gender and racial
inequalities, the structural causes of economic inequality also have to be
removed in order to ‘de-violentize’ society. This includes above all the right
to own one’s labour. No one should be
denied access to the means of production, land and resources needed to exercise
her/his right to work, nor should he/she appropriate more than this necessity:
“The human should have nothing but what he strives for”.
Furthermore, since social and individual development are interrelated,
individuals have the right to be provided with conditions and resources that
enable their right to work. An ‘Islamic
society’ must therefore be a communal society in which people share their
surplus wealth with others. It is the
duty of society to provide a dignified life for those who work but are unable
to make a dignified living, as well as those who are unable to work. Those who
earn their living through their own labour and those who share the fruits of
their labour with others are granted the highest positions by God, and
ridiculing them is declared an unforgivable sin:
Those who slander such of
the Believers as give themselves freely to charity, as well as such as can find
nothing to give but the fruits of their labour, and throw ridicule on them, God
will throw back their ridicule to them: And they shall have a grievous penalty.
‘Believers’, in other words, are people who share
their wealth with others:
And collect (wealth) and
hide it. Surely man was created very
impatient…And niggardly when wealth and good reaches him, except those who
devoted to prayer and those who the needy and deprived have fixed portion of
right over it.
This is also true at the global level, for if
development is not universal it will grind to a halt; uneven development will
inevitably increase global levels of violence and destruction. Societies must cooperate so that growth and
development become global rather than regional or local phenomena:
and help one another in
goodness and piety, and do not help one another in sin and aggression.
One precondition for the right to labour in any
society is the prevention of the exploitation or theft of labour, a phenomenon
that is deeply embedded in feudalist and capitalist economies. The right to demand compensation is therefore
a universal right. The Koran cites
forty-two types of material exploitation, many of which will be familiar to
contemporary readers, including “monopoly”; “confiscation”; “the concentration
of jobs”; “the exercise of political power”; “forced marriage in order to take
the control of one’s wealth”; “deduction from one’s labour”; “war with the aim
of taking any form of booty”; “the devaluation of currency”; and “enforcing
taxes which aim at flow of wealth to the wealthy”.
We can see that the doctrine of de-violentization
emphasizes the removal of the causes of violence. However, it does not assume that this alone
will diminish its effects. Instead, it
recognizes that socio-political, cultural and economic violence is the result
of structural conditions that creates their own dynamism, and that the
relationships between the causes and effects of violence are often complex (in
some cases, the effect may even reinforce the cause). Hence de-violentization also aims at
neutralizing the effects of violence.
Distinguishing pacifism and de-violentization
in practice
Here we can draw a comparative analysis between the
doctrines of de-violentization and pacifism, for the differences between them
become most visible in the treatment of the effects of violence. Pacifism in its
absolute terms rejects the use of violence irrespective of circumstances, while
the doctrine of de-violentization is based on the belief that power will not be
neutralized without resistance. However,
this resistance can take two different forms. One is pacifism; however, if this
fails then the doctrine allows the use of defensive violence in order to
neutralize aggressive violence. Vivid examples of the implementation of the
doctrine in its pacifist form could be seen during the 1979 Iranian revolution,
while its defensive form was exemplified during the first nine months of the
Iran-Iraq war.
The 1978-79 Iranian
revolution: a pacifist form of
resistance to violence
The 1979 Iranian
revolution aimed to remove the structural bases for the production of violence
(the country’s dependent dictatorial monarchy) and replace it with a democratic
system with Islam as its identity and discourse. However, the Shah’s regime had the fifth
strongest army in the world and the total support of western countries,
primarily the USA and including the USSR.
If the revolutionaries had followed the revolutionary discourse current
at the time and enter guerrilla warfare with the regime, it would have lead to
great bloodshed. However, the
revolutionaries, affected with Islamic spirituality,
which was embedded in Iranian culture, spontaneously
resorted to pacifist methods of struggle and refrained from responding in kind
when heavy-handed violence was used against them. The pacifist method of
struggle was so dominant that despite the killing of thousands of
revolutionaries, neither the regime’s military personnel nor any of the tens of
thousands of Americans who were living in Iran were killed.
Many found this difficult
to explain and understand. For example, then-US president Jimmy Carter once
expressed his amazement as to why no American was killed in the riots, as he
called the revolution. Michel Foucault was also stunned by the non-violent
nature of the revolution, despite its highly charged atmosphere. After spending
good time on the streets of Tehran he came to the conclusion that the Iranian revolution had
the potential to offer something missing in the modern world, something “that
we have forgotten, even as a possibility, since the Renaissance and the great
crises of Christianity: a political spirituality”.
After visiting Iran during the revolution, Princeton Professor of Law Richard
Falk argued that it was “amazingly non-violent in its tactics and orientation, despite
extraordinary levels of provocation and incitement designed to induce
violence”. So
here you can see that Islamic culture provided an spiritual atmosphere, in
which the revolutionaries used pacifist methods in order to achieve their
goal.
Not only did the revolutionaries refuse to use
violence against the violence of the army, but the majority also refused to
view the army as an enemy. Instead, they showered them with flowers and
constantly called them to join in resisting the Shah’s regime. For this reason this early period of
revolution, in much contradiction to its later violent phase, is known as the
“victory of flower over bullet”. In this case, pacifist methods provided the
condition for victory and prevented considerable bloodshed on both sides.
The implementation of de-violentization during the Iran-Iraq
war
However, when the Iraqi
army attacked Iran in 1980 it was clear that the aggression could not be
resisted through pacifist methods and that its disastrous consequences could
not be prevented without the deployment of the armed forces, obviously a
violent form of resistance.
Nevertheless, then-president and commandar-in-chief of the armed forces
A. H. Banisadr implemented policies of de-violentization throughout the
war. Several of the most significant are
discussed below.
First, Banisadr abolished
the principle of “blind obedience” in the military, which was the cornerstone
of army discipline during the Shah’s time (and indeed in most armies around the
world today). In other words, a soldier or officer could refuse to carry
out orders that he considered inhumane, without fear of punishment.
Second, he ordered his
generals to refrain from conducting any military mission, which might endanger
Iraqi civilians. In other words, the concept of “collateral damage” was
not one that could be applicable within this doctrine. As a result, during the first nine months of
the war when Banisadr was in charge, there was not a single report of any Iraqi
civilian casualties or destruction of civilian properties.
Third, Banisadr
challenged the classic definition of military victory as inflicting the highest
numbers of casualties on the enemy while sustaining the lowest amount. He
argued that the best military victory was rather achieved when both sides
fighting receive the least amount of casualties. Hence, he ordered his
officers to refrain from inflicting casualties on the Iraqi army for its own
sake and as a result the lives of many of Iraqi soldiers were saved.
Fourth, Banisadr issued an
order to the army rank and file, in which he stated that Iraqi prisoners of war
should be treated humanely and their dignity should not be violated. For
this reason he also ordered that Iraqi prisoners should not be handed to the hot-headed
revolutionary guards but rather to the army police. As a result, the treatment of Iraqi prisoners
was so humane that the Red Cross praised Iran for its treatment of prisoners –
despite the fact that Iranian prisoners endured harsh conditions in Iraqi
camps.
Fifth, when Saddam
Hussein’s missiles and artilleries struck cities and killed and injured
thousands of civilians, Banisadr resisted public calls for revenge. In fact, on
one occasion while visiting the site of a lethal missile attack in Dezful city
he was surrounded by survivors shouting for revenge, and made an historical
statement that both Iranians and Iraqis are victims of Saddam’s dictatorship,
and that he would hence not violate the Human Rights of Iraqis because Saddam
has violated those of Iranians. The revolution,
he argued, aimed at upholding these rights and he would not be one to betray
these goals.
As a result of this policy and despite Iran’s domination of the air, Iraqi
civilians felt secure during the war.
The fierce resistance of Iran’s armed forces and the humane treatment of
Iraqi prisoners also had a deep psychological effect on the Iraqi army. It was thus no surprise that after nine
months of war, Saddam Hussein (who had initially planned to break the record of
Israel’s Six-Day War) became so desperate for a ceasefire that he accepted
Iran’s conditions and offered Iran a handsome compensation of $50 billion. Were it not for the clergy’s June 1981
against the elected president, the Iran-Iraq war would have ended then.
Prioritizing peace in
de-violentization
In these examples we can
see that the doctrine of de-violentization is based on the principle of peace
as a prime right, as presented in the Koranic verse that “God invites to the
home of peace”
and “peace is better.”
Ali, in fact, stated that the honor of peace should never be broken by
Moslem soldiers, which is why one of his first decrees as elected leader one of
his first decrees was to stop the war of aggression, which was conducted by
Moslems after Mohammad’s death. The path to this peace is
through freedom and development: “whoever becomes Moslem will be freed and will
develop.”
However, as development is impossible without freedom and free will, then, even
the Prophet had no authority over the people to enforce a desired conduct:
“(Prophet) tell people I am not the owner of your loss or your gain.”
In order for social
forces to organize themselves in the path of development, they should be freed
from any form of violence. Any inflicted violence should therefore be
neutralized by either pacifist resistance, or, if this method is ineffective,
through controlled defensive violence.
Hence, when Moslem communities are violently attacked by external
enemies, then permission is given for self-defence:
“Permission (to fight) is
given to those upon whom war is made because they are oppressed, and most
surely Allah is well able to assist them.”
Moslems not only have the right to fight against an invading army
but also have a duty to resist, as such resistance prevents them from becoming
subjugated by their enemy, which is one of the worst forms of violence:
“O you who believe! when you meet those who disbelieve
marching for war, then turn not your backs to them.”
However, even when Moslems are left with no choice but
self-defence, the fight should be conducted only to neutralize the aggression
and should not be exceeded:
“And fight in the way of
Allah with those who fight with you, and do not exceed the limits, surely Allah
does not love those who exceed the limits.”
Furthermore, if an invading army asks for peace even
in the midst of war, Moslems cannot reject the offer on the grounds that the
invaders have a “false belief”:
“O you who believe! when you go to war in
Allah's way, make investigation, and do not say to any one who offers you
peace: You are not a believer.”
Also, if non-Moslems have not been involved in a war
of aggression against Moslems and have not forced Moslems out of their homes,
then not only can differences in belief not be used as an excuse to fight against
“non-believers”; furthermore, Moslems can have mutual respect, friendship and
love for others with different beliefs:
“Allah does not forbid you respecting those who have not made
war against you on account of (your) religion, and have not driven you forth
from your homes, that you show them kindness and deal with them justly; surely
Allah loves the doers of justice.”
Additionally, defensive war is not confined to defense
of one’s own community. It is the duty
of Moslems to help any group of people who have been oppressed and
discriminated against by other groups, but are unable to defend for themselves:
“And what reason have
you that you should not fight in the way of Allah and of the weak among the men
and the women and the children, (of) those who say: Our Lord! cause us to go
forth from this town, whose people are oppressors, and give us from Thee a
guardian and give us from Thee a helper.”
Based
on this principle, Ali argued that one should tread on the “right path”,
neither becoming a tyrant nor bowing to tyranny, and should help defend the
weak against tyrants.
In
these Koranic verses we can see a radical departure from a pacifist doctrine,
which rejects the use of force irrespective of circumstances, for it recognizes
self defense as a main principle of human rights. Furthermore, it does not limit the concept of
self-defense to preservation of one’s life when confronted with physical
threat, but expands the concept to imply defense of the right to live in
freedom and dignity. Forcing an individual
to live in an inferior position without rights or freedom is in gross violation
of human dignity, which is sanctified by God.
Furthermore, based on this same principle, it is the duty of those who
enjoy life in freedom to help those who are deprived of such a life and who are
unable to defend themselves.
Why
de-violentization cannot be pacifist in absolute terms
In societies where certain groups of
people have a tendency to resort to violence to dominate others, absolute
pacifism rejects the rights of people for self-defense against violations of
their rights. Because violence will not
stop until it reaches its goal of total domination, it can take total control
over societies. The presence of extreme right groups in the form of
fundamentalist religious or racist organizations in western countries and
violent fundamentalisms in Islamic countries are only two examples of this
historical trend.
Pacifism can be effective and lead to the
spread of peace only when aggressive power is constrained from using maximum violence by internal mechanisms
(i.e., conscience, humanity, or civility) or external mechanisms (i.e., international law, public opinion, or a democratic apparatus). In the absence or
ineffective presence of such mechanisms, resorting to pacifism as the only
method of resistance will be in sheer violation of people’s human rights since
by depriving them from the right of self-defense we condemn them to accept a
life under domination and the loss of their human rights. This would be one of the worst forms of
violence that this doctrine could inflict upon its followers if it would be
implemented irrespective of circumstances.
However, if pacifism is seen as a sub-category of de-violentization,
then the doctrine will be used according to the circumstances.
However the doctrine of de-violentization
does recognize that there are grave dangers to those who commit violent acts,
even in self- defense. For regardless of
its purpose, committing a violent act will have psychological and emotional
consequences for the actor. One possible consequence is that the user might
become addicted to and alienated by violent forms of power. Indeed, one of the ironies of history is that
oppressed people sometimes end up oppressing other social groups and communities
in their struggles for liberation. This
is why Mohammad called the first defensive jihad, which he undertook a
“minor jihad” (Jahade Asghar), and immediately after asked the
warriors to begin a “Great jihad” (Jahade Akbar), which he
defined as a struggle against one’s ego.
Hence, the spiritual, emotional and psychological struggle to be
cleansed of the effects of violence is given greater priority than actually
fighting aggression.
Conclusion
The doctrine of de-violentization aims to
de-alienate the human psyche and belief systems from power and power relations,
and to make human beings cognizant of their Godly nature as they are God’s
vicegerents on Earth. This attempt
to return to one’s nature is the right of all people, including oppressors. One’s struggle against aggressive violence
does not only aim at liberating the oppressed, but also to free the oppressor
from violence that they have become addicted to and alienated by. That is why Mohammad stated that oppressors
should also be helped by preventing them from committing acts of oppression.
In order to achieve its goal, the doctrine
addresses both the causes and effects of violence. It aims at establishing a humanist,
democratic and egalitarian system, which addresses the needs of individuals and
societies for progress.
De-violentization believes that the establishment of free communities
cannot be achieved without constant struggle against power in all of its forms,
as it is power that undermines peace and harmony in self, society and
nature. Hence it is based on the
assumption that power is the sole source of the production and consumption of
systematic violence, and that this cannot be neutralized without resistance. While resistance should initially be
pacifist, if specific circumstances do not allow for the success of this
method, then with utmost care de-violentization permits the use of defensive
violence in order to neutralize aggressive one in order to establish peace.
The Anabaptist movement began in 1525
in Zurich, Switzerland. Its founders, Conard Grebel and Felix Mantz,
aimed at rediscovering the true meaning of Christianity – one of many reactions
within the Christian world to the increasing corruption of the Roman Catholic
Church. Hence, in opposition to the corruption
of the Church’s teaching, their point of reference became the faith, ethics and
codes of conduct of early Christianity.
For more detailed information see Claus-Peter Clasen, Anabaptism: A social history, 1525-1618 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1972).
A. H. Banisadr, Human
Rights in Islam (Arab Encyclopedia House, c1987), p. 11.
Jay Parini, Benjamin’s
Crossing (NY: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), p. 74.
One can trace the historical roots of this
belief in both Christian and Islamic work to Aristotlian philosophy, in which
women are viewed as inferior to men. See Aristotle, Politics, Book One,
Part II, (350 B.C.), available online at: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html
(accessed 10 January 2007).
Aristotelian and Platonic
philosophy are routinely taught in religious seminars as integral elements of
Islamic philosophy. Two types of
philosophy are taught in Houzeh: “western” and “Islamic”. However, ancient Greek philosophers are not
considered part of the ‘western’ tradition. ‘Western’ philosophy is dated from
the Enlightenment and extends to modern and post-modern philosophy. ‘Islamic’ philosophy, on the other hand, is
comprised of two schools: Aristotelian philosophy (Falsefeye Mashaei) and
Intuitivism (Eshragh).
Islamic teaching differentiates little between the two schools to such
an extent that Aristotle is considered to be the first master of Islamic
philosophy, Farabi the second and Sohrevardi the third. Interview by the author with Hassan Rezaei, 28 June 2005.
